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Abstract. In this paper, we evaluate probability of non-zero
secrecy capacity of multi-hop relay networks over Nakagami-
m fading channels in presence of hardware impairments. In
the considered protocol, a source attempts to transmit its data
to a destination by using multi-hop randomize-and-forward
(RF) strategy. The data transmitted by the source and relays
are overheard by an eavesdropper. For performance evalu-
ation, we derive exact expressions of probability of non-zero
secrecy capacity (PoNSC), which are expressed by sums of
infinite series of exponential functions and exponential inte-
gral functions. We then perform Monte Carlo simulations to
verify the theoretical analysis.
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1. Introduction
Recently, physical-layer security (PLS) has gained
much attention as an efficient method to obtain the secu-
rity in the presence of eavesdroppers, without using complex
cryptographic methods [1]. In PLS, the performance is mea-
sured by secrecy capacity which is different between channel
capacity of the data and eavesdropping links [2]. In addition,
important performance metrics such as secrecy outage prob-
ability (SOP) and probability of non-zero secrecy capacity
(PoNSC) are commonly used to evaluate the system secrecy
performance [3].
To improve the secrecy performances for wireless sys-
tems, diversity relaying protocols [4], [5] have become
a promising technique. In [6] and [7], the authors evalu-
ated the secrecy performances of the relaying networks at
the second phase (cooperative phase). In particular, the pub-
lished work [6] proposed the joint relay and jammer selection
methods to enhance the security for secondary networks in
underlay cognitive radio. The authors in [7] investigated the
impact of co-channel interference on the secrecy performance
of various relay selection strategies. In [8] and [9], dual-hop
secured communication protocols in one-way and two-way
relaying networks were studied, respectively. Moreover, the
authors in [8] proposed a switch-and-stay combining method
to obtain the security, while the authors in [9] investigated im-
pact of antenna selection on two-way secured communication
scenarios. Published works [10], [11] focused on the secured
transmission in multi-hop approaches. In [10], cluster-based
multi-hop protocols with various relay selection methods ap-
plied for each dual-hop were proposed to further improve
the secrecy performances, as compared with the random and
conventional relay selection methods. The authors in [11]
considered the impact of the positions and transmit power of
the interference sources (external sources) on the SOP in the
limited interference environment.
However, the authors in [10], [11] assumed that
transceiver hardware of wireless devices is perfect. In prac-
tice, the transceiver hardware is imperfect due to phase
noises, amplifier-amplitude non-linearity and in phase and
quadrature imbalance (IQI) [12], [13], which degrades per-
formances of wireless relay networks. The authors in [14]
studied the effects of the IQI on the secrecy capacity of the
wiretap channel. Results in [14] presented that the IQI should
be taken into account in the design of secured communication
systems.
To the best of our knowledge, only the published work
[14] evaluating the secrecy performances in the presence of
the hardware imperfection. However, the authors in [14]
only considered the effects of the IQI in one-hop orthogonal
frequency-division multiple access (OFDMA) communica-
tion systems. Unlike [14], this paper investigates the impact
of hardware impairments on the probability of non-zero se-
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crecy capacity (PoNSC) of a multi-hop transmission scheme,
where the data transmitted from a source, via multiple relays,
to a destination is overheard by an eavesdropper. In the
proposed scheme, the transceiver hardware of the source,
relays, destination and eavesdropper is not perfect. Further-
more, the randomize-and-forward (RF) strategy is used by
the source and relays so that the eavesdropper cannot com-
bine the received data [15]. For performance evaluation, we
derive exact expressions of the PoNSC over Nakagami-m fad-
ing channels, which are expressed by sums of infinite series
of exponential functions and exponential integral functions.
In order to provide insights into the system performance,
asymptotic closed-form expressions of the PoNSC at high
transmit signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) are also provided. Fi-
nally, Monte Carlo simulations are performed to verify the
theoretical derivations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The sys-
tem model of the proposed protocol is described in Sec. 2. In
Sec. 3, we evaluate the performance of the considered proto-
col. The simulation results are shown in Sec. 4. Finally, this
paper is concluded in Sec. 5.
2. System Model
In Fig. 1, we present the system model of the proposed
protocol, where the source T0 attempts to transmit its data to
the destinationTN via N−1 relay nodes, i.e., T1,T2, ...,TN−1.
In this network, there is an eavesdropper E overhearing the
data transmitted by the source and relays. We assume that all
of the nodes are equipped with a single antenna; therefore,
the data transmission is realized by time division multiple
access (TDMA). Moreover, the transmitting nodes such as
source and relays employ the randomize-and-forward (RF)
technique to confuse the eavesdropper. In particular, the
source and relays encode the data by randomly generating
code-books to avoid the eavesdropper E from combining the
received data [15]. We also assume that the eavesdropper E
is passive and hence the channel state information (CSI) of
the eavesdropping links are not available at the authorized
nodes. However, the statistics such as path-loss exponent,
link distances between nodes, distributions of the wireless
channels are assumed to be available.
Let us denote hn and gn as channel gains of the
Tn−1 → Tn and Tn−1 → E links, respectively, where
n = 1, 2, ..., N . It is assumed that all of the fading channels
between two arbitrary terminals are Nakagami-m [16]. The
Nakagami-m fading channel is a generalized model which is
widely used to describe different fading environments.
Considering the communication at the nth hop between
the nodes Tn−1 and Tn, the instantaneous SNR received at
Tn can be given as in [12, eq. (17)]:
ΨDn =
Phn(
κ2
t,Dn + κ
2
r,Dn
)
Phn + N0
=
ψhn
κ2∑
,Dnψhn + 1
=
χn
κDn χn + 1
.
(1)
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Fig. 1. System model of the proposed protocol.
In (1), P is the transmit power of the node Tn−1. It is
assumed that all of the transmitters including the source and
relays have the same transmit power. The terms N0 in (1) is
variance of zero-mean Gaussian noises at the node Tn. Next,
the constants κt,Dn and κr,Dn are the hardware impairment
levels at the transmitter Tn−1 and the receiver Tn, respec-
tively; and √κDn = κ∑ ,Dn = √κ2t,Dn + κ2r,Dn is the aggregate
level of impairments on the Tn−1 → Tn link [12]. Finally, the
remaining notations in (1) are denoted as follows: ψ = P/N0
and χn = ψhn.
Similarly, the SNR received at the eavesdropper E from
the transmission of the node Tn−1 is expressed by
ΨEn =
Pgn(
κ2
t,Dn + κ
2
r,E
)
Pgn + N0
=
ϕn
κEnϕn + 1
(2)
where κr,E is the level of the hardware impairments at the
eavesdropper E; κEn = κ2t,Dn + κ
2
r,E; and ϕn = ψgn.
Because hn and gn are channel gains of Nakagami-m
fading channels, their probability density functions (PDFs)
can be given respectively as (see [17, eq. (7)])
fhn (x) =
1
Γ (mDn)
(mDnσn)mDn xmDn−1 exp (−mDnσnx) ,
fgn (x) =
1
Γ (mEn)
(mEnτn)mEn xmEn−1 exp (−mEnτnx) (3)
where mDn and mEn are Nakagami-m parameters of the
Tn−1 → Tn andTn−1 → E links, respectively;σn = 1/E {hn}
and τn = 1/E {gn} (E (X ) is expected value of RV X
(X ∈ {hn, gn})); and Γ (.) is Gamma function [18].
Moreover, since χn = ψhn and ϕn = ψgn, χn and ϕn
are also Nakagami-m random variables (RVs). When mDn
and mEn are integers, the PDFs of the RVs χn and ϕn can be
obtained as (see [19, eq. (4)])
fχn (x) =
(
mDnσn
ψ
)mDn xmDn−1
(mDn − 1)! exp
(
−mDnσn
ψ
x
)
=
λmDnn xmDn−1
(mDn − 1)! exp (−λnx) ,
fϕn (x) =
(
mEnτn
ψ
)mEn xmEn−1
(mEn − 1)! exp
(
−mEnτn
ψ
x
)
=
ΩmEnn xmEn−1
(mEn − 1)! exp (−Ωnx) (4)
where λn = mDnσn/ψ and Ωn = mEnτn/ψ.
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To take path-loss into account, we can model σn and
τn, similarly to [20], as
σn = d
β
Dn, τn = d
β
En (5)
where dDn and dEn are distances of the Tn−1 → Tn and
Tn−1 → E links, respectively; and β is path-loss exponent
which varies from 2 to 6.
From (4), the corresponding cumulative distribution
function (CDF) of the RVs χn and ϕn are respectively given
by
Fχn (x) = 1 − exp (−λnx)
mDn−1∑
t=0
(λnx)t
t!
,
Fϕn (x) = 1 − exp (−Ωnx)
mEn−1∑
t=0
(Ωnx)t
t!
.
(6)
Now, let us consider the secrecy capacity at the nth hop,
which can be formulated similarly as in [10]:
CSecn = max
(
0,
1
N
log2 (1 + ΨDn) −
1
N
log2 (1 + ΨEn)
)
= max
(
0,
1
N
log2
(
1 + ΨDn
1 + ΨEn
))
(7)
where the factor 1/N indicates that the data transmission is
split into N orthogonal time slots.
Because the RF strategy is used by the source and re-
lays, the end-to-end secrecy capacity of the N-hop relaying
network can be obtained as
CSece2e = minn=1,2,...,N
(
CSecn
)
. (8)
Equation (8) implies that the end-to-end se-
crecy capacity is dominated by the secrecy ca-
pacity of the weakest hop [15].
3. Performance Analysis
In this paper, the secrecy performance of the proposed
protocol is evaluated, in terms of the PoNSC [15]. From (1),
(2), (7) and (8), the PoNSC can be formulated as
PNSC = Pr
(
CSece2e > 0
)
=
N∏
n=1
Pr
(
CSecn > 0
)
=
N∏
n=1
Pr (ΨDn > ΨEn)
=
N∏
n=1
Pr
(
χn
κDn χn + 1
>
ϕn
κEnϕn + 1
)
︸                                  ︷︷                                  ︸
Pn
.
(9)
Moreover, the probability Pn can be rewritten as fol-
lows:
Pn =

Pr ( χn > ϕn) ; if κDn = κEn
Pr
(
ϕn <
χn
1+∆1χn
)
; if κDn > κEn
Pr
(
χn >
ϕn
1+∆2ϕn
)
; if κDn < κEn
(10)
where ∆1 = κDn − κEn and ∆2 = κEn − κDn.
As presented in (10), depending on values of κDn and
κEn, we consider three cases as follows:
Case 1: κDn = κEn
In this case, the authorized node Tn and the eavesdropper E
are assumed to have the same hardware structure (e.g., both
are mobile users), hence their hardware impairment levels
are same (see [13]). Then, from (10), the PoNSC at the nth
hop is formulated by
Pn =
∫ +∞
0
(
1 − Fχn (x)
)
fϕn (x) dx. (11)
Substituting the results given in (4) and (6) into (11);
and using [18, eq. (3.351.3)] for the corresponding integrals,
we can obtain
Pn =
mDn−1∑
t=0
(t + mEn − 1)!
t! (mEn − 1)!
λtnΩ
mEn
n
(λn +Ωn)t+mEn
. (12)
It can be observed from (12) that the PoNSC Pn does
not depend on the transmit SNR ψ(P/N0) as well as the
hardware impairment levels.
Case 2: κDn > κEn
In this case, the eavesdropper is equipped with a better
transceiver, as compared with that of the nodes Tn, e.g.,
the node E is a base station while Tn is a mobile user. Then,
the PoNSC in (10) can be formulated by
Pn =
∫ +∞
0
Fϕn
(
x
1 + ∆1x
)
fχn (x) dx. (13)
Combining (4), (6) and (13), after some manipulations,
it can be obtained that
Pn = 1−
mEn−1∑
t=0
Ωtn
t!
λmDnn
(mDn − 1)!
×
∫ +∞
0
xt+mDn−1
(1 + ∆1x)t
exp
(
− Ωnx
1 + ∆1x
− λnx
)
. (14)
Next, by changing variable y = 1+∆1x, we can rewrite
(14) under the following form:
Pn = 1 −
mEn−1∑
t=0
Ωtn
t!
λmDnn
(mDn − 1)!
1
∆
t+mDn
1
exp
(
λn −Ωn
∆1
)
×
∫ +∞
1
(y − 1)t+mDn−1
yt
exp
(
Ωn
∆1y
)
exp
(
−λn
∆1
y
)
dy . (15)
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Next, applying binomial expansion for (y − 1)t+mDn−1;
and substituting this result into (15), we arrive at
Pn = 1−
mEn−1∑
t=0
Ωtn
t!
λmDnn
(mDn − 1)!
1
∆
t+mDn
1
exp
(
λn −Ωn
∆1
)
×
t+mDn−1∑
v=0
(−1)vCvt+mDn−1
×
∫ +∞
1
ymDn−v−1 exp
(
Ωn
∆1y
)
exp
(
−λn
∆1
y
)
dy. (16)
Remark 1: It can be observed that the PoNSC Pn is ex-
pressed by sum of integrals because it is impossible to find a
closed-form expression for the integrals given in (16). How-
ever, it is too difficult to use integral-form expressions to
design and optimize the system, which motivates us to ex-
press Pn by a more useful form: infinite series of closed-form
expressions (see [21]).
At first, the exponential function exp (Ωn/∆1/y) in (16)
can be expressed by an infinite series as
exp
(
Ωn
∆1y
)
=
+∞∑
w=0
1
w!
(
Ωn
∆1y
)w
. (17)
Substituting (17) into (16), which yields
Pn = 1−
mEn−1∑
t=0
Ωtn
t!
λmDnn
(mDn − 1)!
1
∆t+mDn1
exp
(
λn −Ωn
∆1
)
×
t+mDn−1∑
v=0
+∞∑
w=0
(−1)v
w!
Cvt+mDn−1
(
Ωn
∆1
)w
×
∫ +∞
1
ymDn−v−w−1 exp
(
−λn
∆1
y
)
dy︸                                       ︷︷                                       ︸
I1
. (18)
In order to calculate the integral I1 in (18), we have to
consider three cases as follows:
• mDn − w − v − 1 = 0 or w = mDn − v − 1
In this case, it is obvious that
I1 =
∆1
λn
exp
(
−λn
∆1
)
. (19)
• mDn − w − v − 1 > 0 or w < mDn − v − 1
At first, using [18, 2.321.2], we obtain a following re-
sult:∫ +∞
1
xr exp (−ax) dx = exp (−a)
r∑
k=0
k!Ckr /ak+1 (20)
where r is a positive integer, a is positive constant and
Ckr = r!/k!/ (r − k)!. From (20), the integral I1 in this
case can be calculated by
I1 = exp
(
−λn
∆1
) mDn−w−v−1∑
k=0
k!CkmDn−w−v−1
(
∆1
λn
)k+1
. (21)
• mDn − w − v − 1 < 0 or w > mDn − v − 1
In this case, by employing [18, 3.351.4], we have
∫ +∞
1
exp (−ax)
xr
dx = exp (−a)
r−2∑
k=0
(−1)kak
k∏
l=0
(r − 1 − l)
+
(−1)r−1ar−1
(r − 1)! E1 (a) (22)
where r is a positive integer, a is positive constant and E1(.)
is exponential integral function [18]. Therefore, we can cal-
culate I1 by
I1 =
∫ +∞
1
1
yv+w+1−mDn
exp
(
−λn
∆1
y
)
dy
= exp
(
−λn
∆1
) w+v−mDn−1∑
k=0
(−1)k (λn/∆1)k
k∏
l=0
(w + v − mDn − l)
+
(−1)w+v−mDn (λn/∆1)w+v−mDn
(w + v − mDn)! E1
(
λn
∆1
)
. (23)
From (18), (19), (21) and (23), an exact expression of
the PoNSC Pn can be given as in (24).
However, equation (24) is still complex which does not
provide any insights into system performance, which moti-
vates us to find simpler expressions for Pn.
At first, when the transmit SNR ψ is high, we can ap-
proximate Pn in (10) by
Pn
ψ→+∞≈ Pr
(
ϕn <
1
∆1
)
= Fϕn
(
1
∆1
)
ψ→+∞≈ 1 − exp
(
−Ωn
∆1
) mEn−1∑
t=0
1
t!
(
Ωn
∆1
) t
. (25)
Moreover, (25) can be approximated by a simpler ex-
pression as follows:
Pn
ψ→+∞≈ Fϕn
(
1
∆1
)
ψ→+∞≈ 1
mEn!
(
Ωn
∆1
)mEn
. (26)
Substituting the results obtained by (25) and (26) into
(9), the PoNSC can be approximated by the following closed-
form formulas:
PNSC
ψ→+∞≈
N∏
n=1
1 − exp
(
−Ωn
∆1
) mEn−1∑
t=0
1
t!
(
Ωn
∆1
) t, (27)
PNSC
ψ→+∞≈
N∏
n=1
1
mEn!
(
Ωn
∆1
)mEn
. (28)
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Pn = 1−
mEn−1∑
t=0
Ωtn
t!
λmDnn
(mDn − 1)!
1
∆
t+mDn
1
exp
(
λn −Ωn
∆1
)
×
t+mDn−1∑
v=0

(−1)v
(mDn−v−1)!C
v
t+mDn−1
(
Ωn
∆1
)mDn−v−1 ∆1
λn
exp
(
−λn
∆1
)
+
mDn−v−2∑
w=0
(−1)v
w! C
v
t+mDn−1
(
Ωn
∆1
)w
exp
(
−λn
∆1
) mDn−w−v−1∑
k=0
k!Ck
mDn−w−v−1
(
∆1
λn
)k+1
+
+∞∑
w=mDn−v
(−1)v
w! C
v
t+mDn−1
(
Ωn
∆1
)w
× *..,exp
(
−λn
∆1
) w+v−mDn−1∑
k=0
(−1)k (λn/∆1)k
k∏
l=0
(w+v−mDn−l)
+
(−1)w+v−mDn (λn/∆1)w+v−mDn
(w+v−mDn )! E1
(
λn
∆1
)+//-

. (24)
Remark 2: From (25), it is obvious that the PoSNC Pn at
high transmit SNR ψ depends on ψ and mEn. In particular,
Pn decreases when the value of ψ increases, which means
that as κDn > κEn, the secrecy performance is worse with
increasing of the transmit power. Moreover, the performance
also degrades with higher value of the Nakagami-m parame-
ter of the eavesdropping link (mEn). Indeed, as shown in (26)
and (28), the Pn and PNSC decrease with the slope of mEn and
N∑
n=1
mEn, respectively.
Case 3: κDn < κEn
In this case, the hardware transceiver of the nodes Tn is better
that of the eavesdropper, e.g., Tn can be a base station while
E is only a mobile user. Similarly, we can rewrite Pn in (10)
under the following form:
Pn =
∫ +∞
0
(
1 − Fχn
(
x
1 + ∆2x
))
fϕn (x) dx
=
mDn−1∑
t=0
λtn
t!
ΩmEnn
(mEn − 1)!
1
∆t+mEn2
exp
(
Ωn − λn
∆2
)
×
t+mEn−1∑
v=0
+∞∑
w=0
(−1)v
w!
Cvt+mEn−1
(
λn
∆2
)w
×
∫ +∞
1
ymEn−v−w−1 exp
(
−Ωi
∆2
y
)
dy︸                                       ︷︷                                       ︸
I2
. (29)
Similarly, when w = mEn − v − 1, w < mEn − v − 1 and
w > mEn − v − 1, the integral I2 in (29) can be calculated
respectively by
I2 =
∆2
Ωn
exp
(
−Ωn
∆2
)
,
I2 = exp
(
−Ωn
∆2
) mEn−w−v−1∑
k=0
k!CkmEn−w−v−1
(
∆2
Ωn
)k+1
,
I2 = exp
(
−Ωn
∆2
) w+v−mEn−1∑
k=0
(−1)k (Ωn/∆2)k
k∏
l=0
(w + v − mEn − l)
+
(−1)w+v−mEn (Ωn/∆2)w+v−mEn
(w + v − mEn)! E1
(
Ωn
∆2
)
. (30)
From the results obtained above, an exact expression of
Pn can be given by (31).
Also, considering the value of Pn at high ψ regions, we
obtain the following result:
Pn
ψ→+∞≈ Pr
(
γn >
1
∆2
)
ψ→+∞≈
mDn−1∑
t=0
1
t!
(
λn
∆2
) t
exp
(
−λn
∆2
)
. (32)
From (9) and (32), the approximate closed-form expres-
sion of the PoNSC at high transmit SNR can be expressed as
follows:
PNSC
ψ→+∞≈
N∏
n=1

mDn−1∑
t=0
1
t!
(
λn
∆2
) t
exp
(
−λn
∆2
) . (33)
Remark 3: We can observe from (32) and (33) that as
κDn < κEn, the value of PoNSC at the nth hop increases when
the transmit power increases. Furthermore, the PoNSC per-
formance is also better with high value of the Nakagami-m
parameter of the data link.
4. Simulation Results
In this section, we perform Monte-Carlo simulations
to verify the theoretical derivations provided in Section 3.
For each Monte-Carlo simulation, we performed 106 trials
in which the channel coefficients between two nodes X and
Y are randomly generated, where X,Y ∈ {T0,T1,...,TN,E}.
Then, the simulated PNSC is computed by the number of
trials that the end-to-end secrecy capacity is higher than zero
divided by the number of trials (106). In the simulation en-
vironment, the source is placed at the position (0, 0), the
destination is located at (1, 0), the position of the relay node
Tn is (n/N, 0), where n = 1, 2, ..., N − 1, and the position of
the eavesdropper is (xE, yE), where 0 ≤ xE, yE ≤ 1. In all
of the simulations, the path-loss exponent β is fixed by 3.
In order to present the impact of the hardware imperfection
on the secrecy performance clearly, we can assume that the
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Pn =
mDn−1∑
t=0
λtn
t!
Ω
mEn
n
(mEn − 1)!
1
∆
t+mEn
2
exp
(
Ωn − λn
∆2
)
×
t+mEn−1∑
v=0

(−1)v
(mEn−v−1)!C
v
t+mEn−1
(
λn
∆2
)mEn−v−1 ∆2
Ωn
exp
(
−Ωn
∆2
)
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hardware impairment levels on the data links (the eavesdrop-
ping links) are same, i.e., κDn = κD (κEn = κE) for all n.
Also, it is also assumed that mDn = mD and mEn = mE for all
n. Moreover, for the theoretical results, we truncate infinite
series at first 100 terms.
In Fig. 2, we present the PoNSC as a function of the
transmit SNR ψ(P/N0) in dB. In this simulation, the num-
ber of hops (N) is fixed by 4, the Nakagami-m parameters
mD is set by 2, the hardware impairment levels κD and κE
equals to 0.2 and 0.1, respectively, the eavesdropper is lo-
cated at the position (0.5, 0.5). We can see that the secrecy
performance significantly degrades with the increasing of the
transmit SNR. Moreover, the PoNSC of the proposed proto-
col is also worse when the channels of the eavesdropping
links are better (mE is higher). Finally, it is worth noting that
the simulation results (denoted by Sim) match very well with
the theoretical ones (denoted by Exact), which validates our
derivations.
In Fig. 3, we verify the approximate closed-form ex-
pressions given in (27) and (28) by presenting the theoretical
results of PoNSC at high transmit SNR. The parameters used
for this simulation are N = 5, mD = 2, κD = 0.2, κE = 0,
xE = 0.3 and yE = 0.4. It can be seen that the asymptotic
values (denoted by Appro) in (27) rapidly converges to the
exact ones at low and medium ψ region, while that of (28)
reaches to the exact ones at medium and high ψ regime.
Moreover, we can also observe from this figure that the slope
of the curves equals to the number of NmE, which verifies
the result obtained in (28).
Figure 4 presents the PoNSC as a function of the trans-
mit SNR ψ in dB when the hardware transceiver of the au-
thorized nodes is better than that of the eavesdropper, i.e.,
κD < κE. In this figure, we set the value of the parameters
by N = 3, mE = 3, κD = 0.05, κE = 0.1 and xE = yE = 0.3.
As illustrated in Fig. 4, the PoNSC increases when the trans-
mit SNR ψ increases. In addition, the performance is also
better when the Nakagami-m parameter of the data link is
higher. Again, the simulation and theoretical results are in
good agreement, while the asymptotic PoNSC converges to
the exact PoNSC at medium and high ψ regimes.
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Fig. 2. Probability of non-zero secrecy capacity as a function
of the transmit SNR ψ in dB with different values of
mE, when N = 4, mD = 2, κD = 0.2, κE = 0.1 and
xE = yE = 0.5.
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Fig. 3. Probability of non-zero secrecy capacity as a function of
the transmit SNR ψ in dB with different values of mE,
when N = 5, mD = 2, κD = 0.2, κE = 0, xE = 0.3 and
yE = 0.4.
In Fig. 5, we investigate the impact of the number of
hops on the secrecy performance of the proposed protocol
when ψ = 0dB, mD = 1, mE = 2, κD = 0.05, κE = 0.1 and
xE = yE = 0.5. An interesting result presented in this figure
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Fig. 4. Probability of non-zero secrecy capacity as a function
of the transmit SNR ψ in dB with different values of
mD, when N = 3, mE = 3, κD = 0.05, κE = 0.1 and
xE = yE = 0.3.
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Fig. 5. Probability of non-zero secrecy capacity as a function of
the number of hops N with different values of κD and κE,
when ψ = 0dB mD = 1, mE = 2, κD = 0.05, κE = 0.1
and xE = yE = 0.5.
is that when the hardware impairment level at the authorized
nodes is lower or equal to that of the eavesdropper, the PoNSC
increases when the number of hops increases. It is also seen
that in case where κD > κE, the secrecy performance changes
with the increasing of the number of hops. Moreover, it is
worth noting that there exists an optimal value of N at which
the PoNSC is highest, i.e., N = 5.
Figure 6 presents the impact of the hardware impair-
ment level κE on the PoNSC with different positions of the
eavesdropper, i.e., (0, 0.3), (0.5, 0.3) and (1, 0.3). The re-
maining parameters are set by ψ = 0dB, N = 4, mD = 1,
mE = 2 and κD = 0.55. As expected, the secrecy perfor-
mance of the proposed protocol is better when the hardware
impairment level κE increases. Moreover, the eavesdropper’s
position affects on the system performance. For example,
in this figure, the PoNSC is highest when the eavesdropper
is near the destination (xE, yE) = (1, 0.3)), and the PoNSC
is lowest when the eavesdropper is located at (0.5, 0.3).
Fig. 6. Probability of non-zero secrecy capacity as a function
of κE with various positions of the eavesdropper when
ψ = 0dB, N = 4, mD = 1, mE = 2, κD = 0.55.
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and κD = κE.
In Fig. 7, we investigate the impact of the eavesdropper’s
position on the secrecy performance when κD = κE, N = 3,
mD = mE = 2. In particular, we fix the value of yE, while
changing that of xE from 0 to 1. As we can see, the secrecy
performance significantly improves when the eavesdropper is
far the authorized nodes, i.e., yE increases. Similar to Fig. 6,
it is also seen that the PoNSC is highest when the eavesdrop-
per is near the destination. Moreover, for each value of yE,
there exists a value of xE at which the PoNSC is lowest.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, the impact of hardware impairments on
the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (PoNSC) of the
multi-hop RF relaying protocol was investigated. The ob-
tained results in this paper can be listed as follows:
• We derive exact expressions of the PoNSC over
Nakagami-m fading channels. These formulas are ex-
pressed by infinite series of exponential functions and
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exponential integral functions. Moreover, Monte Carlo
simulations are also performed to validate the correc-
tion of our derivations. Results presented that simula-
tion and theoretical results are in good agreement when
we truncate infinite series at first 100 terms.
• The hardware impairment level significantly affects on
the secrecy performance. In particular, the PoNSC
rapidly increases with low impairment level at the au-
thorized nodes and high impairment level at the eaves-
dropper. In addition, when the transceiver hardware
of the eavesdropper is better that of the authorized
nodes, the system performance seriously degrades,
where the performance-degradation slope equals to the
Nakagami-m parameter of the eavesdropping link.
• When the hardware impairment level at the authorized
nodes are better than that of the eavesdropper, the
PoNSC increases with the increasing of the transmit
SNR and the number of hops. Furthermore, with the
same impairment levels at all of the nodes, the secrecy
performance does not depend on the transmit SNR as
well as the hardware impairments.
• The position of the eavesdropper also affects on the
value of the PoNSC, i.e., the system performance is
better when the eavesdropper is near the destination.
The results obtained in this paper are useful for designing and
optimizing the multi-hop secured communication networks.
In future works, we will study secured relaying protocols
with relay selection methods in presence of hardware impair-
ments.
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